Paradigms and self-reference: what is the point of asserting paradoxical sentences?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F20%3A00113970" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/20:00113970 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_9" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_9</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_9" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_9</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Paradigms and self-reference: what is the point of asserting paradoxical sentences?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A paradox, according to Wittgenstein, is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus, one way of dealing with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: ‘one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.’ (PG, p.346) There are several instances of this paradox scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell’s paradox. The above quotation is Wittgenstein’s version of the vicious circle principle which counteracts the paradox. The prohibition Wittgenstein describes is, however, limited to a certain language-game. Finally, I argue that there is a structural analogy between a noun being employed as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. Paradoxical sentences are not prohibited forever; they can indicate a change in our praxis with a given paradigm.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Paradigms and self-reference: what is the point of asserting paradoxical sentences?

Popis výsledku anglicky

A paradox, according to Wittgenstein, is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus, one way of dealing with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: ‘one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.’ (PG, p.346) There are several instances of this paradox scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell’s paradox. The above quotation is Wittgenstein’s version of the vicious circle principle which counteracts the paradox. The prohibition Wittgenstein describes is, however, limited to a certain language-game. Finally, I argue that there is a structural analogy between a noun being employed as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. Paradoxical sentences are not prohibited forever; they can indicate a change in our praxis with a given paradigm.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA19-16680S" target="_blank" >GA19-16680S: Paradigmatické myšlení: singularita, universalita, sebe-reference</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at the World from the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy

ISBN

9783030275686

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

123-134

Počet stran knihy

560

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Cham, Switzerland

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

000630349000011