The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F22%3A00129024" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/22:00129024 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/31855/30016" target="_blank" >https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/31855/30016</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.011" target="_blank" >10.12775/LLP.2021.011</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The present paper offers the rule of existential generalisation (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution

Popis výsledku anglicky

The present paper offers the rule of existential generalisation (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA19-12420S" target="_blank" >GA19-12420S: Hyperintenzionální význam, teorie typů a logická dedukce</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Logic and logical philosophy

ISSN

1425-3305

e-ISSN

2300-9802

Svazek periodika

31

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

PL - Polská republika

Počet stran výsledku

37

Strana od-do

105-141

Kód UT WoS článku

000701852400001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85129552949