What Should Be? Navigating Moral Exemplarity and Its Categorical Imperative

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F23%3A00132781" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/23:00132781 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://distinctio.net/index.php/home/article/view/45/32" target="_blank" >https://distinctio.net/index.php/home/article/view/45/32</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.56550/d.2.2.2" target="_blank" >10.56550/d.2.2.2</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

What Should Be? Navigating Moral Exemplarity and Its Categorical Imperative

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This essay explores the notion of moral exemplarity, positing that our morality is underpinned by moral exemplars – paradigmatic examples of virtuous individuals or actions. Theoretical precepts of moral exemplarity are explored across historical and contemporary contexts, including the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Stoic and Christian ethics, and recent works of Alexandro Ferrara and Linda Zagzebski. This essay debates the necessity of moral exemplars, the intrinsic moral and epistemic exemplarity, and the distinction between categorical and hypothetical exemplarity, as well as referencing the paradoxical Kantian dismissals of moral exemplarity. It critiques current accounts of moral exemplarity and proposes a transcendental explanation, culminating in an examination of the “exemplarist categorical imperative.”

Název v anglickém jazyce

What Should Be? Navigating Moral Exemplarity and Its Categorical Imperative

Popis výsledku anglicky

This essay explores the notion of moral exemplarity, positing that our morality is underpinned by moral exemplars – paradigmatic examples of virtuous individuals or actions. Theoretical precepts of moral exemplarity are explored across historical and contemporary contexts, including the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Stoic and Christian ethics, and recent works of Alexandro Ferrara and Linda Zagzebski. This essay debates the necessity of moral exemplars, the intrinsic moral and epistemic exemplarity, and the distinction between categorical and hypothetical exemplarity, as well as referencing the paradoxical Kantian dismissals of moral exemplarity. It critiques current accounts of moral exemplarity and proposes a transcendental explanation, culminating in an examination of the “exemplarist categorical imperative.”

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Distinctio

ISSN

2939-0826

e-ISSN

2939-2764

Svazek periodika

2

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

HR - Chorvatská republika

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

45-58

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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