Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F24%3A00135266" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/24:00135266 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003240792-7</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

I argue that Kripke’s apparent disagreement with Wittgenstein’s claims about the Standard Meter is based on two different ways of fixing reference. Kripke proposes that “meter” rigidly refers to the length that the Standard Meter has at time t0. This length is an abstract object postulated by the theory of absolute space. Wittgenstein, in contrast, seems to presuppose that “meter” rigidly refers to the Standard Meter. Both ways of fixing reference have their advantages and disadvantages. Yet Wittgenstein’s way of fixing reference entails that a statement attributing to the Standard Meter a definite length in meters is without truth-value, while for Kripke, such attributions are accidentally true or accidentally false. This truth-value gap reappears in Kripke’s modal theoretical framework. Existential and modal claims about basic particulars are without truth-value. Both Wittgenstein and Kripke cannot but allow for certain truth-value gaps, which are instances of paracomplete reasoning.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter

Popis výsledku anglicky

I argue that Kripke’s apparent disagreement with Wittgenstein’s claims about the Standard Meter is based on two different ways of fixing reference. Kripke proposes that “meter” rigidly refers to the length that the Standard Meter has at time t0. This length is an abstract object postulated by the theory of absolute space. Wittgenstein, in contrast, seems to presuppose that “meter” rigidly refers to the Standard Meter. Both ways of fixing reference have their advantages and disadvantages. Yet Wittgenstein’s way of fixing reference entails that a statement attributing to the Standard Meter a definite length in meters is without truth-value, while for Kripke, such attributions are accidentally true or accidentally false. This truth-value gap reappears in Kripke’s modal theoretical framework. Existential and modal claims about basic particulars are without truth-value. Both Wittgenstein and Kripke cannot but allow for certain truth-value gaps, which are instances of paracomplete reasoning.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein : The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond

ISBN

9781032139975

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

127-140

Počet stran knihy

314

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

001215437500007