Are Standard Lawlike Propositions Metaphysically Necessary? Hildebrand vs. Groarke

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15260%2F14%3A33150404" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15260/14:33150404 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=studneoar&id=studneoar_2014_0011_0001_0089_0133" target="_blank" >http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=studneoar&id=studneoar_2014_0011_0001_0089_0133</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Are Standard Lawlike Propositions Metaphysically Necessary? Hildebrand vs. Groarke

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

I discuss Dietrich von Hildebrand, a realist phenomenologist, and Louis Groarke, an Aristotelian. They are close in epistemology and modal metaphysics, but divided about the metaphysical necessity of standard lawlike propositions - i.e., standard naturallaws and standard truths about natural kinds. I extract and undermine the reasons of both authors. Hildebrand claims that no standard lawlike proposition is metaphysically necessary, since none is in principle knowable solely by considering essences. Iundermine this when I argue that the explanation of positive instances of at least some standard lawlike propositions by the metaphysical necessity of these propositions is quite plausibly (though not probably) true. Groarke claims that some standard lawlike propositions are metaphysically necessary, since their positive instances exemplify natural kinds that make all their members necessarily similar in relevant ways. I undermine this, too, as I point out the obscurity of relevant simil

Název v anglickém jazyce

Are Standard Lawlike Propositions Metaphysically Necessary? Hildebrand vs. Groarke

Popis výsledku anglicky

I discuss Dietrich von Hildebrand, a realist phenomenologist, and Louis Groarke, an Aristotelian. They are close in epistemology and modal metaphysics, but divided about the metaphysical necessity of standard lawlike propositions - i.e., standard naturallaws and standard truths about natural kinds. I extract and undermine the reasons of both authors. Hildebrand claims that no standard lawlike proposition is metaphysically necessary, since none is in principle knowable solely by considering essences. Iundermine this when I argue that the explanation of positive instances of at least some standard lawlike propositions by the metaphysical necessity of these propositions is quite plausibly (though not probably) true. Groarke claims that some standard lawlike propositions are metaphysically necessary, since their positive instances exemplify natural kinds that make all their members necessarily similar in relevant ways. I undermine this, too, as I point out the obscurity of relevant simil

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EE2.3.30.0041" target="_blank" >EE2.3.30.0041: Podpora vytváření excelentních výzkumných týmů a intersektorální mobility na Univerzitě Palackého v Olomouci II.</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Studia neoaristotelica

ISSN

1214-8407

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

11

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

45

Strana od-do

89-133

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—