Prior and Tichý's Concepts of Temporalism

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F22%3A73617992" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/22:73617992 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sav.sk/index.php?lang=sk&doc=journal-list&part=article_response_page&journal_article_no=29388" target="_blank" >https://www.sav.sk/index.php?lang=sk&doc=journal-list&part=article_response_page&journal_article_no=29388</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29404" target="_blank" >10.31577/orgf.2022.29404</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Prior and Tichý's Concepts of Temporalism

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

At the beginning of modern logic, propositions were defined as unchangeable entities placed in a certain idealistic realm. These unchangeable propositions contain in themselves so-called indexicals, i.e. the place, time and other circumstances of the utterance. This concept of the proposition, which is entitled eternalism, was and is still prevalent among analytic philosophers. Often even the term &apos;proposition&apos; is identified with an idealistic entity located outside the real world. In my paper, I would like to focus on the concept of propositions of two logicians who deviated from the standard understanding of propositions, Arthur N. Prior and Pavel Tichý. They were both proponents of temporalism, i.e. the view that propositions could change their truth-value over time. The paper will discuss the reasons why they were proponents of temporalism and compare their views. It claims that in Prior&apos;s case, his metaphysical views were the main reasons he was a proponent of temporalism. In contrast, when Tichý presented his arguments for temporalism, he focused primarily on natural language.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Prior and Tichý's Concepts of Temporalism

Popis výsledku anglicky

At the beginning of modern logic, propositions were defined as unchangeable entities placed in a certain idealistic realm. These unchangeable propositions contain in themselves so-called indexicals, i.e. the place, time and other circumstances of the utterance. This concept of the proposition, which is entitled eternalism, was and is still prevalent among analytic philosophers. Often even the term &apos;proposition&apos; is identified with an idealistic entity located outside the real world. In my paper, I would like to focus on the concept of propositions of two logicians who deviated from the standard understanding of propositions, Arthur N. Prior and Pavel Tichý. They were both proponents of temporalism, i.e. the view that propositions could change their truth-value over time. The paper will discuss the reasons why they were proponents of temporalism and compare their views. It claims that in Prior&apos;s case, his metaphysical views were the main reasons he was a proponent of temporalism. In contrast, when Tichý presented his arguments for temporalism, he focused primarily on natural language.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Organon F

ISSN

1335-0668

e-ISSN

2585-7150

Svazek periodika

2022

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

453-468

Kód UT WoS článku

000922046900004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85146971593