Ideas, indexicals, and the private language in Frege's philosophy

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F24%3A00138579" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/24:00138579 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://digilib.phil.muni.cz/handle/11222.digilib/digilib.81188" target="_blank" >https://digilib.phil.muni.cz/handle/11222.digilib/digilib.81188</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/sPh2024-2-2" target="_blank" >10.5817/sPh2024-2-2</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Ideas, indexicals, and the private language in Frege's philosophy

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The study concerns a possible private language in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, particularly in his scarce investigation of indexicals such as 'I' and 'now'. The indexicals may be seen as private from the late-Wittgensteinian perspective because their sense (Sinn) cannot be repeated outside of a specific linguistic context of the expression. The study examines whether these indexicals presuppose a private language. If Frege's philosophy contains such privateness (for which only insufficient evidence can be found), it would be peculiar since a major part of his work implies that all thoughts are objective and publicly communicable. However, the privateness in Frege's remarks rather differs from Wittgenstein's, for the indexical's sense should be principally expressible at any time.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Ideas, indexicals, and the private language in Frege's philosophy

Popis výsledku anglicky

The study concerns a possible private language in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, particularly in his scarce investigation of indexicals such as 'I' and 'now'. The indexicals may be seen as private from the late-Wittgensteinian perspective because their sense (Sinn) cannot be repeated outside of a specific linguistic context of the expression. The study examines whether these indexicals presuppose a private language. If Frege's philosophy contains such privateness (for which only insufficient evidence can be found), it would be peculiar since a major part of his work implies that all thoughts are objective and publicly communicable. However, the privateness in Frege's remarks rather differs from Wittgenstein's, for the indexical's sense should be principally expressible at any time.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Studia philosophica

ISSN

1803-7445

e-ISSN

2336-453X

Svazek periodika

71

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

7-20

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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