The Problem of Recognition of Human Rights: Does Explicative-Existential Justification Really Work?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F21%3A00119071" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/21:00119071 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/4602/explicative-existential-justification-of-human-rights-analysis-of-robert-alexys-argument-in-context-of-is-ought-problem/" target="_blank" >https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/4602/explicative-existential-justification-of-human-rights-analysis-of-robert-alexys-argument-in-context-of-is-ought-problem/</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.2.5" target="_blank" >10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.2.5</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Problem of Recognition of Human Rights: Does Explicative-Existential Justification Really Work?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper analyses Robert Alexy's explicative-existential justification of human rights. The author identifies several problems that are associated with it. An analysis of Alexy's explicative argument suggests that it cannot cope with the transition from facts to norms. Notably, this argument does not explain why its requirements cannot be overruled by some other moral reason (for example, the utility principle). The answer that Alexy offers in his existential argument is not considered sufficient by the author of this paper. Although this argument complements the necessary normative premises, the existential decision preferred by Alexy is not the only one necessary. It can be admitted that for many people such a decision is attractive. However, even if we accept that explicative-existential justification is credible in some context, it is correct to apply it only to the rights of persons and not to the rights of human beings. In the final part, the author shows that the claim that this theory can justify even the rights of human beings who are not persons is indefensible.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Problem of Recognition of Human Rights: Does Explicative-Existential Justification Really Work?

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper analyses Robert Alexy's explicative-existential justification of human rights. The author identifies several problems that are associated with it. An analysis of Alexy's explicative argument suggests that it cannot cope with the transition from facts to norms. Notably, this argument does not explain why its requirements cannot be overruled by some other moral reason (for example, the utility principle). The answer that Alexy offers in his existential argument is not considered sufficient by the author of this paper. Although this argument complements the necessary normative premises, the existential decision preferred by Alexy is not the only one necessary. It can be admitted that for many people such a decision is attractive. However, even if we accept that explicative-existential justification is credible in some context, it is correct to apply it only to the rights of persons and not to the rights of human beings. In the final part, the author shows that the claim that this theory can justify even the rights of human beings who are not persons is indefensible.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-10464S" target="_blank" >GA20-10464S: Kontextuální vazby justifikace lidských práv jako problém právní filosofie</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej: Journal of the Polish Section of IVR

ISSN

2082-3304

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

27

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

PL - Polská republika

Počet stran výsledku

11

Strana od-do

5-15

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85147469440