The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F24%3A00135734" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/24:00135734 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/case-for-judicial-councils-as-fourthbranch-institutions/9C1A6DBEC87D90D64546EB133BFF6F73" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/case-for-judicial-councils-as-fourthbranch-institutions/9C1A6DBEC87D90D64546EB133BFF6F73</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019624000038" target="_blank" >10.1017/S1574019624000038</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Many European countries have transferred powers concerning judicial careers and court administration to judicial councils. These independent bodies were intended to depoliticise the judiciary, maintain a balance between judicial independence and accountability, and ideally increase the quality and efficiency of the judicial branch. Supranational organisations, judges, policymakers, lawyers and political scientists argue vehemently whether judicial councils delivered the goods they promised. Constitutional theorists lag behind. They either skipped the debate on where to place judicial councils within the separation of powers, assuming that they belonged to the judicial branch, or lament that judicial councils violate the classical tripartite separation of powers without addressing new advancement in the separation of powers scholarship. This article aims to fill this gap and theorises about the place and role of judicial councils in the separation of powers. It argues that all judicial councils gravitate towards one of four ideal types – judge-controlled, politician-controlled, inter-branch and fourth-branch – each placing the judicial council in a different position vis-à-vis the three classical branches. Based on the experience with judicial councils so far, we argue that conceptualising judicial councils as fourth-branch institutions provides the best protection against the two greatest dangers judicial councils face – corporativism and politicisation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions

Popis výsledku anglicky

Many European countries have transferred powers concerning judicial careers and court administration to judicial councils. These independent bodies were intended to depoliticise the judiciary, maintain a balance between judicial independence and accountability, and ideally increase the quality and efficiency of the judicial branch. Supranational organisations, judges, policymakers, lawyers and political scientists argue vehemently whether judicial councils delivered the goods they promised. Constitutional theorists lag behind. They either skipped the debate on where to place judicial councils within the separation of powers, assuming that they belonged to the judicial branch, or lament that judicial councils violate the classical tripartite separation of powers without addressing new advancement in the separation of powers scholarship. This article aims to fill this gap and theorises about the place and role of judicial councils in the separation of powers. It argues that all judicial councils gravitate towards one of four ideal types – judge-controlled, politician-controlled, inter-branch and fourth-branch – each placing the judicial council in a different position vis-à-vis the three classical branches. Based on the experience with judicial councils so far, we argue that conceptualising judicial councils as fourth-branch institutions provides the best protection against the two greatest dangers judicial councils face – corporativism and politicisation.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

R - Projekt Ramcoveho programu EK

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European constitutional law review

ISSN

1574-0196

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

20

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

38

Strana od-do

82-119

Kód UT WoS článku

001174005900001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85186866550