Lidská práva jako utilitaristický projekt

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F24%3A00139522" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/24:00139522 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0913110410.31577filozofia.2024.79.7.3.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0913110410.31577filozofia.2024.79.7.3.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.7.3" target="_blank" >10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.7.3</a>

Jazyk výsledku

čeština

Název v původním jazyce

Lidská práva jako utilitaristický projekt

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Human rights, as a special kind of moral rights, have traditionally been seen as guides for legally institutionalized human rights practice. However, there are several problems with this conception. It seems that not every moral right makes sense to translate into a legal form, and at the same time not all legal rights have a moral antecedent. Thus, human rights ethics requires some supplementation in order to justify institutionalized rights. At the same time, it is not usually seen as final, but we expect it to be supported by further justification, for example by its relation to normative agency, basic needs or capabilities. This raises the question of whether it is redundant, whether its role could be superseded by elements that further justify it. The article defends the thesis that as such it can be superseded by utilitarian reasons. Using them, we can reach the same conclusions, but with several significant advantages over competing approaches. Utilitarianism is not only an analytically clear theory that minimizes the normative basis of our reasoning, but it can offer a justification for that practice without having to be supplemented by some other approach. At the same time, it can easily deal with the redundancy objection.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Human Rights as Utilitarian Project

Popis výsledku anglicky

Human rights, as a special kind of moral rights, have traditionally been seen as guides for legally institutionalized human rights practice. However, there are several problems with this conception. It seems that not every moral right makes sense to translate into a legal form, and at the same time not all legal rights have a moral antecedent. Thus, human rights ethics requires some supplementation in order to justify institutionalized rights. At the same time, it is not usually seen as final, but we expect it to be supported by further justification, for example by its relation to normative agency, basic needs or capabilities. This raises the question of whether it is redundant, whether its role could be superseded by elements that further justify it. The article defends the thesis that as such it can be superseded by utilitarian reasons. Using them, we can reach the same conclusions, but with several significant advantages over competing approaches. Utilitarianism is not only an analytically clear theory that minimizes the normative basis of our reasoning, but it can offer a justification for that practice without having to be supplemented by some other approach. At the same time, it can easily deal with the redundancy objection.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-06790S" target="_blank" >GA23-06790S: Lidská práva a welfarismus</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Filozofia

ISSN

0046-385X

e-ISSN

2585-7061

Svazek periodika

79

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

7

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

737-751

Kód UT WoS článku

001318847300003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85206184307