Judicial Independence

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F25%3A00140346" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/25:00140346 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143" target="_blank" >10.1017/9781108868143</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Judicial Independence

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Despite being nearly universally recognised as a virtue, judicial independence has been challenged in almost all parts of the world. Some commentators even consider it to be so open to differing interpretations as to be a useless concept, that should be unpacked to its smaller components to be studied meaningfully. We are less cynical about the idea. According to our theory, judicial independence exists where powerful actors are unable or unwilling to inappropriately interfere with the workings of the judiciary. Judicial independence is thus a relational concept and always results from the interplay between the capacity and willingness of powerful actors to inappropriately interfere with the judiciary, and the capacity and willingness of judicial actors and their allies to withstand such actions. We distinguish three levels of judicial independence: de jure institutional independence, de facto institutional independence, and decisional independence. Courts are thus independent when powerful actors do not consistently impose their preferences in disputes they have a stake, either by capturing the courts through formal changes of laws governing the judiciary, through rigging these laws in their favour, or by skewing judicial decision-making. By contrast, a dependent judiciary is the one that is captured, rigged or skewed.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Judicial Independence

Popis výsledku anglicky

Despite being nearly universally recognised as a virtue, judicial independence has been challenged in almost all parts of the world. Some commentators even consider it to be so open to differing interpretations as to be a useless concept, that should be unpacked to its smaller components to be studied meaningfully. We are less cynical about the idea. According to our theory, judicial independence exists where powerful actors are unable or unwilling to inappropriately interfere with the workings of the judiciary. Judicial independence is thus a relational concept and always results from the interplay between the capacity and willingness of powerful actors to inappropriately interfere with the judiciary, and the capacity and willingness of judicial actors and their allies to withstand such actions. We distinguish three levels of judicial independence: de jure institutional independence, de facto institutional independence, and decisional independence. Courts are thus independent when powerful actors do not consistently impose their preferences in disputes they have a stake, either by capturing the courts through formal changes of laws governing the judiciary, through rigging these laws in their favour, or by skewing judicial decision-making. By contrast, a dependent judiciary is the one that is captured, rigged or skewed.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory

ISBN

9781108491310

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

867-883

Počet stran knihy

900

Název nakladatele

Cambridge University Press

Místo vydání

Cambridge

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

001314168600050