Rule of Law Compliance Beyond Ticking Boxes.

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F25%3A00142438" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/25:00142438 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-025-00255-6#citeas" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-025-00255-6#citeas</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40803-025-00255-6" target="_blank" >10.1007/s40803-025-00255-6</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Rule of Law Compliance Beyond Ticking Boxes.

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The conditionality mechanism was built on an assumption that complex legal and societal relationships can be reduced to formal institutional indicators, and if these are adopted the Rule of Law can be reinstated. Using the example of Hungary, the present article demonstrates why this mentality of ticking boxes cannot capture the big picture. It will show three practical examples of implemented milestones and how the Hungarian government managed to circumvent them by informal networks, patronage politics and other means resulting in a non-progressive progression. Based on these insights, it highlights that several elements of legal culture affect how legal norms work. Because of their informal nature, they cannot be easily amended, challenged or objected to. Therefore, the European Commission often accepts measures and reforms at face value, without taking into account the particularities of a constitutional system. This is partly due to the fact that the centre and the periphery in Europe are culturally divided. The paper also tries to pinpoint the difference between a legal and political mindset, by introducing a Gramscian aspect, and showing how individual measures can add up to a long march through the institutions.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Rule of Law Compliance Beyond Ticking Boxes.

Popis výsledku anglicky

The conditionality mechanism was built on an assumption that complex legal and societal relationships can be reduced to formal institutional indicators, and if these are adopted the Rule of Law can be reinstated. Using the example of Hungary, the present article demonstrates why this mentality of ticking boxes cannot capture the big picture. It will show three practical examples of implemented milestones and how the Hungarian government managed to circumvent them by informal networks, patronage politics and other means resulting in a non-progressive progression. Based on these insights, it highlights that several elements of legal culture affect how legal norms work. Because of their informal nature, they cannot be easily amended, challenged or objected to. Therefore, the European Commission often accepts measures and reforms at face value, without taking into account the particularities of a constitutional system. This is partly due to the fact that the centre and the periphery in Europe are culturally divided. The paper also tries to pinpoint the difference between a legal and political mindset, by introducing a Gramscian aspect, and showing how individual measures can add up to a long march through the institutions.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

R - Projekt Ramcoveho programu EK

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Hague Journal on the Rule of Law

ISSN

1876-4045

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

17

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

June

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

1-18

Kód UT WoS článku

001514262800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105008810730