Rewards for Local Partisans. The Pork Barrel Politics in Slovakia.

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F15%3A00083656" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/15:00083656 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Rewards for Local Partisans. The Pork Barrel Politics in Slovakia.

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. This paper provides an analysis of a program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. Its main aims include tracking the development of the distribution of grants and studying its electoral consequences. The results clearly show that shortly after its introduction the funding program developed from a rather neutral instrument into a mechanism used by governments for their own partisan interests. The cabinets use the distribution ofgrants to reward towns with local leadership from the ruling parties mainly at the expense of representatives from the opposition. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Rewards for Local Partisans. The Pork Barrel Politics in Slovakia.

Popis výsledku anglicky

Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. This paper provides an analysis of a program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. Its main aims include tracking the development of the distribution of grants and studying its electoral consequences. The results clearly show that shortly after its introduction the funding program developed from a rather neutral instrument into a mechanism used by governments for their own partisan interests. The cabinets use the distribution ofgrants to reward towns with local leadership from the ruling parties mainly at the expense of representatives from the opposition. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AD - Politologie a politické vědy

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů