Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F16%3A00088270" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/16:00088270 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-3-251" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-3-251</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-3-251" target="_blank" >10.5817/PC2016-3-251</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. In addition, allocated grants have the potential to increase the prospects of incumbents when seeking reelection. This paper elaborates on these expectations and it studies a governmental program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. The results show that better access to resources is given to towns led by mayors with closer ties to the central cabinet. In coalition governments, however, this advantage is provided primarily to municipalities with mayors supported by the ruling party that directly controls the distribution. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia

Popis výsledku anglicky

Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. In addition, allocated grants have the potential to increase the prospects of incumbents when seeking reelection. This paper elaborates on these expectations and it studies a governmental program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. The results show that better access to resources is given to towns led by mayors with closer ties to the central cabinet. In coalition governments, however, this advantage is provided primarily to municipalities with mayors supported by the ruling party that directly controls the distribution. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-22754S" target="_blank" >GA15-22754S: Kvalita demokracie: Česká republika v komparativní perspektivě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science

ISSN

1211-3247

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

23

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

251-271

Kód UT WoS článku

000445543300003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85028412356