Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F21%3A00118755" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/21:00118755 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents? Despite the attention of scholars to that question, the empirical results are mixed thus far. The present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections. I study the consequences of pork-barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in Slovakia between 2006 and 2018, finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection. The same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years. The effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are, however, moderated by municipal population. More specifically, a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level

Popis výsledku anglicky

Does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents? Despite the attention of scholars to that question, the empirical results are mixed thus far. The present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections. I study the consequences of pork-barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in Slovakia between 2006 and 2018, finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection. The same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years. The effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are, however, moderated by municipal population. More specifically, a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA18-16928S" target="_blank" >GA18-16928S: Distributivní politika ve střední Evropě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Public Choice

ISSN

0048-5829

e-ISSN

1573-7101

Svazek periodika

188

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3-4

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

23

Strana od-do

479-501

Kód UT WoS článku

000565644600002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85089892989