Stopping the Evil or Settling for the Lesser Evil : An Experimental Study of Costly Voting with Negative Payoffs in a TRS Electoral System

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F17%3A00094554" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/17:00094554 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40585-8_9" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40585-8_9</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40585-8_9" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-319-40585-8_9</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Stopping the Evil or Settling for the Lesser Evil : An Experimental Study of Costly Voting with Negative Payoffs in a TRS Electoral System

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The strategic voting across families of various electoral systems is often depicted as “settling for lesser evil” (e.g. Cox, 1997, Gschwend, 2004) in order to prevent the worst outcome of elections. In this paper we experimentally (13 sessions with 18-30 participants, 546 voting situations) explore the degree of strategic voting (as compared to non-voting) framed in situations with (non-compulsory) costly voting where voters face outcomes with positive and negative payoffs (“stopping the evil” framing) and/or with solely negative payoffs (“settling for lesser evil” framing). We explore voters’ decisions in rather complex environment of the two-round electoral system, with symmetric amount of private information about the preferences of electorate available to them and show that voters’ behavior does differ markedly in both the situations. The results have implications for the representation and democracy.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Stopping the Evil or Settling for the Lesser Evil : An Experimental Study of Costly Voting with Negative Payoffs in a TRS Electoral System

Popis výsledku anglicky

The strategic voting across families of various electoral systems is often depicted as “settling for lesser evil” (e.g. Cox, 1997, Gschwend, 2004) in order to prevent the worst outcome of elections. In this paper we experimentally (13 sessions with 18-30 participants, 546 voting situations) explore the degree of strategic voting (as compared to non-voting) framed in situations with (non-compulsory) costly voting where voters face outcomes with positive and negative payoffs (“stopping the evil” framing) and/or with solely negative payoffs (“settling for lesser evil” framing). We explore voters’ decisions in rather complex environment of the two-round electoral system, with symmetric amount of private information about the preferences of electorate available to them and show that voters’ behavior does differ markedly in both the situations. The results have implications for the representation and democracy.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA13-20548S" target="_blank" >GA13-20548S: Experimentální výzkum volebního chování a rozhodování ve vysoce personalizovaných volbách</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Recent Trends in Social Systems : Quantitative Theories and Quantitative Models

ISBN

9783319405834

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

89-103

Počet stran knihy

426

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Heidelberg

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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