Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F18%3A00101962" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/18:00101962 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12117" target="_blank" >https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12117</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12117" target="_blank" >10.1111/geer.12117</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy-efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step-level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff-superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom-up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Popis výsledku anglicky

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy-efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step-level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff-superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom-up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

German Economic Review

ISSN

1465-6485

e-ISSN

1468-0475

Svazek periodika

19

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

119-139

Kód UT WoS článku

000429543200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85003758799