Punishing the weakest link - voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F23%3A00576265" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/23:00576265 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/23:00582621

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Punishing the weakest link - voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a baseline treatment, the level of effort increases substantially once ex post sanctioning opportunities are introduced, that is, when one can assign costly punishment points to other group members to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication, which in contrast to the punishment treatment increases efforts only temporarily and fails to bring the players to higher payoff equilibria permanently. Our results indicate that decentralized sanctions can play an important role as a coordination device in Pareto-ranked coordination settings. They also suggest that the motivations behind voluntary sanctions may be more general than usually put forth in the literature on cooperation games.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Punishing the weakest link - voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game

Popis výsledku anglicky

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a baseline treatment, the level of effort increases substantially once ex post sanctioning opportunities are introduced, that is, when one can assign costly punishment points to other group members to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication, which in contrast to the punishment treatment increases efforts only temporarily and fails to bring the players to higher payoff equilibria permanently. Our results indicate that decentralized sanctions can play an important role as a coordination device in Pareto-ranked coordination settings. They also suggest that the motivations behind voluntary sanctions may be more general than usually put forth in the literature on cooperation games.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GBP402%2F12%2FG130" target="_blank" >GBP402/12/G130: Vztahy mezi dovednostmi, vzděláváním a výsledky na trhu práce: longitudinální studie</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Theory and Decision

ISSN

0040-5833

e-ISSN

1573-7187

Svazek periodika

95

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

429-456

Kód UT WoS článku

001005058700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85161309871