Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F21%3A00118933" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/21:00118933 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://acpo.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/002280.pdf" target="_blank" >https://acpo.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/002280.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/1803-8220/14_2020" target="_blank" >10.14712/1803-8220/14_2020</a>

Jazyk výsledku

čeština

Název v původním jazyce

Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone

Název v anglickém jazyce

Ideal Consensus, Real Diversity, and the Challenge of Public Justification : On the Limits of Idealisation in Liberal Political Theory

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA19-11091S" target="_blank" >GA19-11091S: Jak dál s veřejným rozumem? Kritiky a obhajoby veřejného ospravedlnění podle liberalismu</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Acta Politologica

ISSN

1803-8220

e-ISSN

1804-1302

Svazek periodika

13

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

49-70

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85105852512