Corporate Governance Against Recommendations: The Cases of the Strong Executive and the Strong Ownership

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F12%3A00061204" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/12:00061204 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/61384399:31160/12:00040143

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.7441/joc.2012.03.04" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.7441/joc.2012.03.04</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.7441/joc.2012.03.04" target="_blank" >10.7441/joc.2012.03.04</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Corporate Governance Against Recommendations: The Cases of the Strong Executive and the Strong Ownership

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

There are several basic configurations of corporate governance according to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen?s theory). Effective governance is described as a situation when an owner (or group of owners) keeps the right to ratify and monitor strategic decisions while management has the right to initiate and implement those decisions. There are two particular situations how this recommendation is partially broken and both situations are linked to CEO duality. The first case happens when anowner loses or does not exercise the right to monitor management of the organization and is termed as the strong executive. The second case is called the strong ownership and is distinguished by an owner taking over implementations of the decisions. Thefocus of the study was to explore particularly configurations of the strong executive and the strong governance. A mixed method research design was chosen to explore the differences between the basic governance configurations.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Corporate Governance Against Recommendations: The Cases of the Strong Executive and the Strong Ownership

Popis výsledku anglicky

There are several basic configurations of corporate governance according to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen?s theory). Effective governance is described as a situation when an owner (or group of owners) keeps the right to ratify and monitor strategic decisions while management has the right to initiate and implement those decisions. There are two particular situations how this recommendation is partially broken and both situations are linked to CEO duality. The first case happens when anowner loses or does not exercise the right to monitor management of the organization and is termed as the strong executive. The second case is called the strong ownership and is distinguished by an owner taking over implementations of the decisions. Thefocus of the study was to explore particularly configurations of the strong executive and the strong governance. A mixed method research design was chosen to explore the differences between the basic governance configurations.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AE - Řízení, správa a administrativa

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Competitivenes

ISSN

1804-171X

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

4

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

11

Strana od-do

46-57

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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