Decentralized Punishments in Fighting Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Czech Republic

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F12%3A00067477" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/12:00067477 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Decentralized Punishments in Fighting Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Czech Republic

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper presents possibilities and limits of introducing experimental methods in measuring propensity to engage in and punish corrupt behavior. We are inspired by results of the multicultural experiments run to date. Our experiment is inspired by Cameron et al (2009), which took place in Australia, Indonesia, India and Singapore. It takes a form of a simple sequential game in which three players are involved. The decision of each player has an impact on the behavior and profit of the other players. Results of the experiment are in line with results of replicated experiment. We found several differences between the behavior of the Czech and Slovak participants. Particularly, the Czechs seem to be less tolerant to corruption behavior they witness. Second part of the paper shows the possibilities and limits of using altruistic punishment as anti-corrupt tool. Our finding may support the perceived higher tolerance to corruption behavior in Czech republic and Slovakia.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Decentralized Punishments in Fighting Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Czech Republic

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper presents possibilities and limits of introducing experimental methods in measuring propensity to engage in and punish corrupt behavior. We are inspired by results of the multicultural experiments run to date. Our experiment is inspired by Cameron et al (2009), which took place in Australia, Indonesia, India and Singapore. It takes a form of a simple sequential game in which three players are involved. The decision of each player has an impact on the behavior and profit of the other players. Results of the experiment are in line with results of replicated experiment. We found several differences between the behavior of the Czech and Slovak participants. Particularly, the Czechs seem to be less tolerant to corruption behavior they witness. Second part of the paper shows the possibilities and limits of using altruistic punishment as anti-corrupt tool. Our finding may support the perceived higher tolerance to corruption behavior in Czech republic and Slovakia.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

MODERN AND CURRENT TRENDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH

ISBN

9788021058224

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

22-30

Název nakladatele

MASARYKOVA UNIV

Místo vydání

BRNO

Místo konání akce

Slapanice, CZECH REPUBLIC

Datum konání akce

19. 1. 2012

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000319634100002