Justine Effect: Punishment of the Unduly Self-Sacrificing Cooperative Individuals

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11310%2F14%3A10281115" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11310/14:10281115 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11240/14:10281115 RIV/44555601:13510/14:43885780

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092336" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092336</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092336" target="_blank" >10.1371/journal.pone.0092336</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Justine Effect: Punishment of the Unduly Self-Sacrificing Cooperative Individuals

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Background: Allowing players to punish their opponents in Public Goods Game sustains cooperation within a group and thus brings advantage to the cooperative individuals. However, the possibility of punishment of the co-players can result in antisocial punishment, the punishment of those players who contribute the most in the group. To better understand why antisocial punishment exists, it must be determined who are the anti-social punishers and who are their primary targets. Methods: For resolving thesequestions we increased the number of players in a group from usual four to twelve. Each group played six rounds of the standard Public Goods Game and six rounds of the Public Goods Game with punishment. Each player in each round received 20 CZK ($ 1.25). Players (N=118) were rematched after each round so that they would not take into consideration opponents' past behavior. Results: The amount of the punishment received correlated negatively with the contribution (p= -0.665, p<0.001). Ho

Název v anglickém jazyce

Justine Effect: Punishment of the Unduly Self-Sacrificing Cooperative Individuals

Popis výsledku anglicky

Background: Allowing players to punish their opponents in Public Goods Game sustains cooperation within a group and thus brings advantage to the cooperative individuals. However, the possibility of punishment of the co-players can result in antisocial punishment, the punishment of those players who contribute the most in the group. To better understand why antisocial punishment exists, it must be determined who are the anti-social punishers and who are their primary targets. Methods: For resolving thesequestions we increased the number of players in a group from usual four to twelve. Each group played six rounds of the standard Public Goods Game and six rounds of the Public Goods Game with punishment. Each player in each round received 20 CZK ($ 1.25). Players (N=118) were rematched after each round so that they would not take into consideration opponents' past behavior. Results: The amount of the punishment received correlated negatively with the contribution (p= -0.665, p<0.001). Ho

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP303%2F11%2F1398" target="_blank" >GAP303/11/1398: Úleková reakce a prepulsní inhibice u lidí s latentní toxoplasmosou</a><br>

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

PLoS ONE

ISSN

1932-6203

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

9

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

8

Strana od-do

1-8

Kód UT WoS článku

000333677000039

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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