Defectors' intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12310%2F20%3A43901296" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12310/20:43901296 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/60077344:_____/20:00534347

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-76506-3" target="_blank" >https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-76506-3</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-76506-3" target="_blank" >10.1038/s41598-020-76506-3</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Defectors' intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The theoretical and experimental research on opting out (also called conditional dissociation) in social dilemmas has concentrated on the effect this behavior has on the level of cooperation when used against defectors. The intuition behind this emphasis is based on the common property of social dilemmas that individuals are worse off the more their opponents defect. However, this article shows clearly that other opting out mechanisms are better at increasing cooperative behavior. In fact, by analyzing the stable Nash equilibria for the repeated multi-player public goods game with opting out, our results provide a strong argument that the best opting out rule is one whereby the only groups that voluntarily stay together between rounds are those that are homogeneous (i.e., those groups that are either all cooperators or all defectors), when these groups stay together for enough rounds. This outcome emerges when defectors are completely intolerant of individuals who cooperate (e.g., defectors exhibit xenophobic behavior toward cooperators) and so opt out whenever their group has a cooperator in it. The strong preference by defectors to be with like-minded individuals causes all heterogeneous groups to disband after one round.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Defectors' intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out

Popis výsledku anglicky

The theoretical and experimental research on opting out (also called conditional dissociation) in social dilemmas has concentrated on the effect this behavior has on the level of cooperation when used against defectors. The intuition behind this emphasis is based on the common property of social dilemmas that individuals are worse off the more their opponents defect. However, this article shows clearly that other opting out mechanisms are better at increasing cooperative behavior. In fact, by analyzing the stable Nash equilibria for the repeated multi-player public goods game with opting out, our results provide a strong argument that the best opting out rule is one whereby the only groups that voluntarily stay together between rounds are those that are homogeneous (i.e., those groups that are either all cooperators or all defectors), when these groups stay together for enough rounds. This outcome emerges when defectors are completely intolerant of individuals who cooperate (e.g., defectors exhibit xenophobic behavior toward cooperators) and so opt out whenever their group has a cooperator in it. The strong preference by defectors to be with like-minded individuals causes all heterogeneous groups to disband after one round.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10602 - Biology (theoretical, mathematical, thermal, cryobiology, biological rhythm), Evolutionary biology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Scientific Reports

ISSN

2045-2322

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

10

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

000594818600018

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85095849762