The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14740%2F22%3A00127082" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14740/22:00127082 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Norms for cooperation are essential for groups to function effectively, yet there are often strong incentives for group members to behave selfishly. Direct and indirect reciprocity can help to discourage such uncooperative behaviour by punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators, but require explicit means for punishment and tally-keeping. What, then, encourages an individual to cooperate with their group when others cannot track the behaviour of others? We adapted the Bargaining Game to examine the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among 20 groups of six anonymous players (N = 120) who interacted amongst themselves over recursive bargaining exchanges. By estimating the expected utility that drives players’ demands in these interactions, we demonstrate that their behaviour on each exchange reflects the demands placed upon them previously. Thus, we highlight the role of generalised reciprocity in such situations; that is, when an individual passes on to another member of their group the behaviour they have received previously. Furthermore, we identify four distinct behavioural types that differ in their expressions of generalised reciprocity: Some players converge quickly on cooperative demands regardless of the behaviour they received from their co-players, and are therefore characterised by low expressions of reciprocity. In contrast, individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies decrease their demands over successive interactions in response to the behaviour of their group. By simulating groups with different compositions of these player types, we reveal the strong influence of individual differences in reciprocal tendencies on the emergence of cooperative group dynamics.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms

Popis výsledku anglicky

Norms for cooperation are essential for groups to function effectively, yet there are often strong incentives for group members to behave selfishly. Direct and indirect reciprocity can help to discourage such uncooperative behaviour by punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators, but require explicit means for punishment and tally-keeping. What, then, encourages an individual to cooperate with their group when others cannot track the behaviour of others? We adapted the Bargaining Game to examine the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among 20 groups of six anonymous players (N = 120) who interacted amongst themselves over recursive bargaining exchanges. By estimating the expected utility that drives players’ demands in these interactions, we demonstrate that their behaviour on each exchange reflects the demands placed upon them previously. Thus, we highlight the role of generalised reciprocity in such situations; that is, when an individual passes on to another member of their group the behaviour they have received previously. Furthermore, we identify four distinct behavioural types that differ in their expressions of generalised reciprocity: Some players converge quickly on cooperative demands regardless of the behaviour they received from their co-players, and are therefore characterised by low expressions of reciprocity. In contrast, individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies decrease their demands over successive interactions in response to the behaviour of their group. By simulating groups with different compositions of these player types, we reveal the strong influence of individual differences in reciprocal tendencies on the emergence of cooperative group dynamics.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50101 - Psychology (including human - machine relations)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA18-21791S" target="_blank" >GA18-21791S: Tam a zpět: Zkoumání rovnováhy mezi vlastními cíli a cíli druhých během vyjednávání s použitím metody hyperscanning</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY

ISSN

0167-4870

e-ISSN

1872-7719

Svazek periodika

90

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

June

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

1-13

Kód UT WoS článku

000786690100003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85127362727