Pay-to-Bid Auctions: Evidence from Czech Data

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F13%3A00074751" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/13:00074751 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Pay-to-Bid Auctions: Evidence from Czech Data

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper examines properties of pay-to-bid auctions. Pay-to-bid auctions represent a relatively new type of all-pay auctions in which participants have to pay a fee in order to increase the purchase price by a small fixed bidding increment. The playerwho submits the last bid wins the right to buy the auctioned item at the current purchase price, which is normally substantially lower than the value of the item. While most of the existing studies examine the data on the international server Swoopo.com,we present a unique dataset retrieved from the Czech auction site Bonus.cz. In the paper, we introduce econometric models that explain the total number of bids and seller?s revenue using data from the period between July 2009 and April 2010 where the basic properties of the auctions correspond to the stylized facts found in the US data. We compare the results with predictions of the model of payto- bid auctions introduced by [3].

Název v anglickém jazyce

Pay-to-Bid Auctions: Evidence from Czech Data

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper examines properties of pay-to-bid auctions. Pay-to-bid auctions represent a relatively new type of all-pay auctions in which participants have to pay a fee in order to increase the purchase price by a small fixed bidding increment. The playerwho submits the last bid wins the right to buy the auctioned item at the current purchase price, which is normally substantially lower than the value of the item. While most of the existing studies examine the data on the international server Swoopo.com,we present a unique dataset retrieved from the Czech auction site Bonus.cz. In the paper, we introduce econometric models that explain the total number of bids and seller?s revenue using data from the period between July 2009 and April 2010 where the basic properties of the auctions correspond to the stylized facts found in the US data. We compare the results with predictions of the model of payto- bid auctions introduced by [3].

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 31st International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics 2013

ISBN

9788087035764

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

494-499

Název nakladatele

College of Polytechnics Jihlava

Místo vydání

Jihlava

Místo konání akce

Jihlava

Datum konání akce

11. 9. 2013

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000335578000084