Staff Rotation as the Anti-corruption Tool: Experimental Approach

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F14%3A00077639" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/14:00077639 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Staff Rotation as the Anti-corruption Tool: Experimental Approach

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Regular staff rotation is widely used as an anti-corruption policy in many countries. It is supposed to break a corruption relationship between briber and public official. We study this effect using a laboratory experiment with two framings ? one as economical experiment and second framed according to experimental political science ? which we found not significant to the behavior of the subjects. We extend and modify original study (Abbink, 2004) and want to show if the time between rotations matters. However our findings are in contradiction to the original study. We found lower bribery rate in no-rotation treatment than in rotation treatments. Also we observe no effect of number of periods between each rotation. In our modified design we found stronggender effect in case of bribe offering and also acceptance which follows previous results of bribery experiments. Our contribution is a new modification to the original bribery game which may be subject of further research.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Staff Rotation as the Anti-corruption Tool: Experimental Approach

Popis výsledku anglicky

Regular staff rotation is widely used as an anti-corruption policy in many countries. It is supposed to break a corruption relationship between briber and public official. We study this effect using a laboratory experiment with two framings ? one as economical experiment and second framed according to experimental political science ? which we found not significant to the behavior of the subjects. We extend and modify original study (Abbink, 2004) and want to show if the time between rotations matters. However our findings are in contradiction to the original study. We found lower bribery rate in no-rotation treatment than in rotation treatments. Also we observe no effect of number of periods between each rotation. In our modified design we found stronggender effect in case of bribe offering and also acceptance which follows previous results of bribery experiments. Our contribution is a new modification to the original bribery game which may be subject of further research.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů