Anti-corruption policies in the lab ? staff rotation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F15%3A00084381" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/15:00084381 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Anti-corruption policies in the lab ? staff rotation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Periodical rotation of the staff in public sector is widely tool both for fighting corruption and personal quality growth. With the respect to corruption the aim of the staffrotation mechanism is to disturb any upraising corrupt relationships between thepublic official and the briber. As the introduction of staff rotation is discussed in the Czech Republic, we modified study by Abbink (2004) and conducted laboratory experiment. Similarly to original design we had two treatments, one where the subjectsare matched with same second player for the whole session, other treatment where the subjects are re-matched with another player at the beginning of each period but both keep their roles. The results indicate that staff rotation does not influence frequency or levels of offered bribes; however bribes are more likely to be accepted by public official when there is no rotation. On the other hand we found no difference in the level of accepted bribe among treatments.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Anti-corruption policies in the lab ? staff rotation

Popis výsledku anglicky

Periodical rotation of the staff in public sector is widely tool both for fighting corruption and personal quality growth. With the respect to corruption the aim of the staffrotation mechanism is to disturb any upraising corrupt relationships between thepublic official and the briber. As the introduction of staff rotation is discussed in the Czech Republic, we modified study by Abbink (2004) and conducted laboratory experiment. Similarly to original design we had two treatments, one where the subjectsare matched with same second player for the whole session, other treatment where the subjects are re-matched with another player at the beginning of each period but both keep their roles. The results indicate that staff rotation does not influence frequency or levels of offered bribes; however bribes are more likely to be accepted by public official when there is no rotation. On the other hand we found no difference in the level of accepted bribe among treatments.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů