Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F21%3A00118752" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/21:00118752 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410?needAccess=true" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410?needAccess=true</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410" target="_blank" >10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anticorruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration

Popis výsledku anglicky

Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anticorruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50602 - Public administration

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA17-00496S" target="_blank" >GA17-00496S: Vliv konkurenčních kontrolních mechanismů na dodržování daňových předpisů: experimentální přístup</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Public Performance & Management Review

ISSN

1530-9576

e-ISSN

1557-9271

Svazek periodika

44

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

404-424

Kód UT WoS článku

000567613600001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85090447684