Corrupt reciprocity in public procurement: an experimental study

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F14%3A00077637" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/14:00077637 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Corrupt reciprocity in public procurement: an experimental study

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In the experiment I focus on reciprocal actions of the public official as a response to an offered bribe. When a briber gives the bribe he expects to privately benefit in return. In such situation a certain degree of trust between the briber and the official is required. He/she anticipates a positive reciprocal action from the public official and, since corruption is illegal in most of the countries, he/she also anticipates mutual trust. The experiment is based on existing literature and combines bribery experiment designs by Abbink, Irlenbusch et al. (2002) and Lambsdorff and Frank (2011). I have created a 4-player game with three players acting as bribers (firms) and one as public official. Firms compete with randomly drawn projects with predetermined attributes (same quality, different costs) in public tender. They also get information if the project might be the winning one or not. The decision is weather to offer or not a payment. They label it as a bribe or a gift to public offic

Název v anglickém jazyce

Corrupt reciprocity in public procurement: an experimental study

Popis výsledku anglicky

In the experiment I focus on reciprocal actions of the public official as a response to an offered bribe. When a briber gives the bribe he expects to privately benefit in return. In such situation a certain degree of trust between the briber and the official is required. He/she anticipates a positive reciprocal action from the public official and, since corruption is illegal in most of the countries, he/she also anticipates mutual trust. The experiment is based on existing literature and combines bribery experiment designs by Abbink, Irlenbusch et al. (2002) and Lambsdorff and Frank (2011). I have created a 4-player game with three players acting as bribers (firms) and one as public official. Firms compete with randomly drawn projects with predetermined attributes (same quality, different costs) in public tender. They also get information if the project might be the winning one or not. The decision is weather to offer or not a payment. They label it as a bribe or a gift to public offic

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů