Experimental study of bribery in public procurement
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F15%3A00084370" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/15:00084370 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Experimental study of bribery in public procurement
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Corruption negatively effects economic and market development (Fisman & Svensson 2007), batters social stability and moral foundations (Jong-sung & Khagram 2005) or causes inefficiency in public expenditures and public sector itself (Blackburn etal. 2005). The significant part of public expenditures is usually spent through public procurement. Bribery in public procurement is illegal interaction be- tween a public official responsible for the tender and a competing firm. Reciprocity might be one of potential driving factors of the decisions made by the official in such situation. How will the official react to a bribe? Will his/her decision - who wins the procurement - not be affected by the bribe? Will he/she opportunistically take it but notreturn the favor? Or will he/she blow the whistle and report the briber to authorities? We bring the bribery in public procurement to laboratory and study it experimentally.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Experimental study of bribery in public procurement
Popis výsledku anglicky
Corruption negatively effects economic and market development (Fisman & Svensson 2007), batters social stability and moral foundations (Jong-sung & Khagram 2005) or causes inefficiency in public expenditures and public sector itself (Blackburn etal. 2005). The significant part of public expenditures is usually spent through public procurement. Bribery in public procurement is illegal interaction be- tween a public official responsible for the tender and a competing firm. Reciprocity might be one of potential driving factors of the decisions made by the official in such situation. How will the official react to a bribe? Will his/her decision - who wins the procurement - not be affected by the bribe? Will he/she opportunistically take it but notreturn the favor? Or will he/she blow the whistle and report the briber to authorities? We bring the bribery in public procurement to laboratory and study it experimentally.
Klasifikace
Druh
O - Ostatní výsledky
CEP obor
AH - Ekonomie
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2015
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů