Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F15%3A00085591" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/15:00085591 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/danb-2015-0015" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/danb-2015-0015</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/danb-2015-0015" target="_blank" >10.1515/danb-2015-0015</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper explores the effect of various contract-awarding procedures in public procurement on the price of the contract. We provide a theoretical model that compares prices in different procedures and tests whether there is a significant price difference between the procedures using data from Czech public procurement. The model predicts that auctions are more efficient than negotiations given the same number of suppliers, and open procedures are more efficient than closed procedures if high-cost firmsare selected for the closed procedure. In accordance with the first prediction, we find that open auctions are more efficient than open negotiations. Concerning the second prediction, we find that closed procedures are less efficient than open procedures, which suggests that procurers tend to select relatively more costly firms to participate in closed procedures. Comparing all four awarding procedures, we find that open auctions are the most efficient procedure used in the Czech Republ

Název v anglickém jazyce

Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper explores the effect of various contract-awarding procedures in public procurement on the price of the contract. We provide a theoretical model that compares prices in different procedures and tests whether there is a significant price difference between the procedures using data from Czech public procurement. The model predicts that auctions are more efficient than negotiations given the same number of suppliers, and open procedures are more efficient than closed procedures if high-cost firmsare selected for the closed procedure. In accordance with the first prediction, we find that open auctions are more efficient than open negotiations. Concerning the second prediction, we find that closed procedures are less efficient than open procedures, which suggests that procurers tend to select relatively more costly firms to participate in closed procedures. Comparing all four awarding procedures, we find that open auctions are the most efficient procedure used in the Czech Republ

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

DANUBE: Law and Economics Review

ISSN

1804-6746

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

6

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

241-257

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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