HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F18%3A00101518" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/18:00101518 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013" target="_blank" >10.2478/danb-2018-0013</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY

Popis výsledku anglicky

Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-09404S" target="_blank" >GA15-09404S: Reálné fungování centrálně plánované ekonomiky v Československu</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

DANUBE: Law and Economics Review

ISSN

1804-6746

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

9

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

207-226

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85061695459