Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F19%3A00107873" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/19:00107873 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Popis výsledku anglicky

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA18-19492S" target="_blank" >GA18-19492S: Vliv kvality bydlení na preference a chování: ekonomické experimenty s účastníky randomizovaného kontrolovaného experimentu</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Experimental Econonomics

ISSN

1386-4157

e-ISSN

1573-6938

Svazek periodika

vol. 22

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

issue 4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

37

Strana od-do

1-37

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85076932061