What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F23%3A00130162" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/23:00130162 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063" target="_blank" >10.1177/17835917231153063</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

After an introduction of competition due to liberalisation, there is an expectation of lower prices and better quality. However, these overall positive effects could be also driven by the incumbent's incentive to exclude competition within the liberalised markets. Such a situation occurred on the Prague-Ostrava line where liberalisation brought lower prices and an increase in quality. However, it also brought multiple accusations by both the Czech competition authority and the European Commission of the state-owned incumbent, České dráhy, that it had engaged in predatory pricing. This paper then assesses whether the price decreases within this line were driven by actual competition or by predatory behaviour of České dráhy by analysing the position of České dráhy. The aim of this paper therefore is to assess the real market power of the Czech state incumbent, České dráhy, on the Prague-Ostrava line. To achieve this aim, we used unique data we had gathered from our previous research (such as price development, market shares and customer behaviour). Our results then show that it is unlikely that České dráhy could have acted independently of its competitors and customers, which indicates that it could not have had a dominant position.

Název v anglickém jazyce

What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku anglicky

After an introduction of competition due to liberalisation, there is an expectation of lower prices and better quality. However, these overall positive effects could be also driven by the incumbent's incentive to exclude competition within the liberalised markets. Such a situation occurred on the Prague-Ostrava line where liberalisation brought lower prices and an increase in quality. However, it also brought multiple accusations by both the Czech competition authority and the European Commission of the state-owned incumbent, České dráhy, that it had engaged in predatory pricing. This paper then assesses whether the price decreases within this line were driven by actual competition or by predatory behaviour of České dráhy by analysing the position of České dráhy. The aim of this paper therefore is to assess the real market power of the Czech state incumbent, České dráhy, on the Prague-Ostrava line. To achieve this aim, we used unique data we had gathered from our previous research (such as price development, market shares and customer behaviour). Our results then show that it is unlikely that České dráhy could have acted independently of its competitors and customers, which indicates that it could not have had a dominant position.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF16_026%2F0008430" target="_blank" >EF16_026/0008430: Nová mobilita - vysokorychlostní dopravní systémy a dopravní chování populace</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries

ISSN

1783-5917

e-ISSN

2399-2956

Svazek periodika

24

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

TR - Turecká republika

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

24-39

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85147164975