Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F24%3A00135755" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/24:00135755 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000284" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000284</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

Popis výsledku anglicky

Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

ISSN

0176-2680

e-ISSN

1873-5703

Svazek periodika

82

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

March

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

1-10

Kód UT WoS článku

001220212100001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85189520479