A single-project meta-analysis of multiple threshold public goods games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F25%3A00144402" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/25:00144402 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-economic-science-association/article/singleproject-metaanalysis-of-multiple-threshold-public-goods-games/6690A6D1974A20A32D14FBD3CBCDEEDE" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-economic-science-association/article/singleproject-metaanalysis-of-multiple-threshold-public-goods-games/6690A6D1974A20A32D14FBD3CBCDEEDE</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/esa.2024.4" target="_blank" >10.1017/esa.2024.4</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

A single-project meta-analysis of multiple threshold public goods games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. We pool 17,136 observations at the individual level to summarize the project and investigate the role of learning, gender, and risk attitude, since the included studies are inconclusive in this regard. We find that equally effective coordination devices are the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits, learning, and delegation as long as the intermediary is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. Women delegate less than men, and consequently prefer direct contributions. Risk tolerance increases overall donations but decreases individual earnings. We discuss possible implications of our findings.

Název v anglickém jazyce

A single-project meta-analysis of multiple threshold public goods games

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. We pool 17,136 observations at the individual level to summarize the project and investigate the role of learning, gender, and risk attitude, since the included studies are inconclusive in this regard. We find that equally effective coordination devices are the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits, learning, and delegation as long as the intermediary is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. Women delegate less than men, and consequently prefer direct contributions. Risk tolerance increases overall donations but decreases individual earnings. We discuss possible implications of our findings.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-06785S" target="_blank" >GA20-06785S: Experimentální analýza problematiky přispívání na vícenásobné veřejné statky</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION-JESA

ISSN

2199-6784

e-ISSN

2199-6776

Svazek periodika

11

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

21-34

Kód UT WoS článku

001542824000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—