Inconsistency in Ethics

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25210%2F20%3A39916278" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25210/20:39916278 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/abs/inconsistency-in-ethics/6252B2714DBFAFD1B5AD609E210C9BA6#access-block" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/abs/inconsistency-in-ethics/6252B2714DBFAFD1B5AD609E210C9BA6#access-block</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819120000261" target="_blank" >10.1017/S0031819120000261</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Inconsistency in Ethics

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Consistency is usually seen as one of the hallmarks and a cardinal virtue of moral theory, as well as of any defensible real-life moral perspective. In everyday life a consistent set of moral beliefs is conductive to moral clarity, communicability, responsibility and responsiveness. But this is just one side of the story. In this paper I argue that inconsistency, properly understood, is a productive and constructive aspect of both moral philosophy and our moral lives. After an introductory glance at Ralf Waldo Emerson and Hannah Arendt, the argument proceeds in three main steps. First, I discuss the philosophical importance of paying heed to inconsistencies in our moral lives, which often are prematurely pruned from moral philosophy. Second, I discuss the positive moral roles of inconsistency in terms of responsiveness to different situations, values, needs and concerns that call upon our attention in everyday life. Third, I argue that moral inconsistencies contribute to the necessary adaptability of our moral understandings to changing conditions. Fourth, in the place of a conclusion, I revisit the issue of consistency, clarity and accountability.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Inconsistency in Ethics

Popis výsledku anglicky

Consistency is usually seen as one of the hallmarks and a cardinal virtue of moral theory, as well as of any defensible real-life moral perspective. In everyday life a consistent set of moral beliefs is conductive to moral clarity, communicability, responsibility and responsiveness. But this is just one side of the story. In this paper I argue that inconsistency, properly understood, is a productive and constructive aspect of both moral philosophy and our moral lives. After an introductory glance at Ralf Waldo Emerson and Hannah Arendt, the argument proceeds in three main steps. First, I discuss the philosophical importance of paying heed to inconsistencies in our moral lives, which often are prematurely pruned from moral philosophy. Second, I discuss the positive moral roles of inconsistency in terms of responsiveness to different situations, values, needs and concerns that call upon our attention in everyday life. Third, I argue that moral inconsistencies contribute to the necessary adaptability of our moral understandings to changing conditions. Fourth, in the place of a conclusion, I revisit the issue of consistency, clarity and accountability.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF15_003%2F0000425" target="_blank" >EF15_003/0000425: Centrum pro etiku</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Philosophy

ISSN

0031-8191

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

95

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

447-470

Kód UT WoS článku

000567464000003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85092385202