Being Claimed in Immediate Response to an Other: Against a Foundationalist, and Towards a Relational, Understanding, of Moral Status

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25210%2F23%3A39919483" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25210/23:39919483 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.23743" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.23743</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.23743" target="_blank" >10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.23743</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Being Claimed in Immediate Response to an Other: Against a Foundationalist, and Towards a Relational, Understanding, of Moral Status

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this essay, I propose a phenomenological alternative to the established candidates of what grounds moral status, namely the experience of being claimed in immediate response to an Other. Drawing from late-Wittgensteinian moral philosophy, I develop this alternative in critical juxtaposition to theories that aim to derive moral status from values grounded in independently accountable empirical properties. Against such theories, I expound how meaningful talk of moral status must instead be understood to be rooted in the individuals’ morally charged immediate responsiveness to Others, a responsiveness that preconditions the very possibility of separating value and fact. If my analysis is sound, then the empirical property or set of properties that is commonly taken to qualify as a candidate for a ground of moral status in fact presupposes a phenomenological dimension of ‘ethical encounter’. The recognition of this deeper phenomenological level would, while not disposing with the notion of moral status, transform its meaning and, thus, how much of the philosophical debate on moral status is conducted.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Being Claimed in Immediate Response to an Other: Against a Foundationalist, and Towards a Relational, Understanding, of Moral Status

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this essay, I propose a phenomenological alternative to the established candidates of what grounds moral status, namely the experience of being claimed in immediate response to an Other. Drawing from late-Wittgensteinian moral philosophy, I develop this alternative in critical juxtaposition to theories that aim to derive moral status from values grounded in independently accountable empirical properties. Against such theories, I expound how meaningful talk of moral status must instead be understood to be rooted in the individuals’ morally charged immediate responsiveness to Others, a responsiveness that preconditions the very possibility of separating value and fact. If my analysis is sound, then the empirical property or set of properties that is commonly taken to qualify as a candidate for a ground of moral status in fact presupposes a phenomenological dimension of ‘ethical encounter’. The recognition of this deeper phenomenological level would, while not disposing with the notion of moral status, transform its meaning and, thus, how much of the philosophical debate on moral status is conducted.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

De Ethica : a Journal of Philosophical, Theological, and Applied Ethics

ISSN

2001-8819

e-ISSN

2001-8819

Svazek periodika

7

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

SE - Švédské království

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

3-15

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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