Leveraging the SRTP protocol for over-the-network memory acquisition of a GE Fanuc Series 90-30
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26230%2F17%3APU126449" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26230/17:PU126449 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287617301925" target="_blank" >http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287617301925</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2017.06.005" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.diin.2017.06.005</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Leveraging the SRTP protocol for over-the-network memory acquisition of a GE Fanuc Series 90-30
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are common components implemented across many industries such as manufacturing, water management, travel, aerospace and hospitals to name a few. Given their broad deployment in critical systems, they became and still are a common target for cyber attacks; the most prominent one being Stuxnet. Often PLCs (especially older ones) are only protected by an outer line of defense (e.g., a firewall) but once an attacker gains access to the system or the network, there might not be any other defense layers. In this scenario, a forensic investigator should not rely on the existing software as it might have been compromised. Therefore, we reverse engineered the GE-SRTP network protocol using a GE Fanuc Series 90-30 PLC and provide two major contributions: We first describe the Service Request Transport protocol (GE-SRTP) which was invented by General Electric (GE) and is used by many of their Ethernet connected controllers. Note, to the best of our knowledge, prior to this work, no publicly available documentation on the protocol was available affording users' security by obscurity. Second, based on our understanding of the protocol, we implemented a software application that allows direct network-based communication with the PLC (no intermediate server is needed). While the tool's forensic mode is harmless and only allows for reading registers, we discovered that one can manipulate/write to the registers in its default configuration, e.g., turn off the PLC, or manipulate the items/processes it controls.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Leveraging the SRTP protocol for over-the-network memory acquisition of a GE Fanuc Series 90-30
Popis výsledku anglicky
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are common components implemented across many industries such as manufacturing, water management, travel, aerospace and hospitals to name a few. Given their broad deployment in critical systems, they became and still are a common target for cyber attacks; the most prominent one being Stuxnet. Often PLCs (especially older ones) are only protected by an outer line of defense (e.g., a firewall) but once an attacker gains access to the system or the network, there might not be any other defense layers. In this scenario, a forensic investigator should not rely on the existing software as it might have been compromised. Therefore, we reverse engineered the GE-SRTP network protocol using a GE Fanuc Series 90-30 PLC and provide two major contributions: We first describe the Service Request Transport protocol (GE-SRTP) which was invented by General Electric (GE) and is used by many of their Ethernet connected controllers. Note, to the best of our knowledge, prior to this work, no publicly available documentation on the protocol was available affording users' security by obscurity. Second, based on our understanding of the protocol, we implemented a software application that allows direct network-based communication with the PLC (no intermediate server is needed). While the tool's forensic mode is harmless and only allows for reading registers, we discovered that one can manipulate/write to the registers in its default configuration, e.g., turn off the PLC, or manipulate the items/processes it controls.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/VG20102015022" target="_blank" >VG20102015022: Moderní prostředky pro boj s kybernetickou kriminalitou na Internetu nové generace</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2017
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Digital Investigation
ISSN
1742-2876
e-ISSN
1873-202X
Svazek periodika
2017
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
22
Stát vydavatele periodika
NL - Nizozemsko
Počet stran výsledku
13
Strana od-do
26-38
Kód UT WoS článku
000407728500004
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85026746386