Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26510%2F12%3APU97568" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26510/12:PU97568 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The task of the experimental study reported here is to compare the amount of cooperation in the single-trial Prisoner's Dilemma game and in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We confirmed that subjects (N=45) in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games weremore cooperative than subjects in single-trial games. We also found that there is less cooperation on the last move of an iterated game than there is in single-trial games. Theoretically speaking, defection is strictly dominant in single-trial games, aswell as in games with known finite end. Empirically these predictions are usually not met, and were not met in our study. We offer reasons why this might be so ? specifically, we discuss heuristic decision making rules that might account for cooperationin single-trial games.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Popis výsledku anglicky

The task of the experimental study reported here is to compare the amount of cooperation in the single-trial Prisoner's Dilemma game and in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We confirmed that subjects (N=45) in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games weremore cooperative than subjects in single-trial games. We also found that there is less cooperation on the last move of an iterated game than there is in single-trial games. Theoretically speaking, defection is strictly dominant in single-trial games, aswell as in games with known finite end. Empirically these predictions are usually not met, and were not met in our study. We offer reasons why this might be so ? specifically, we discuss heuristic decision making rules that might account for cooperationin single-trial games.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AE - Řízení, správa a administrativa

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Econ... Vysoká škola báňská -Technická univerzita Ostrava AH AE

ISSN

1803-3865

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

21

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

203-212

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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