The inequality in society and a multipoint extension of nash bargaining problem

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F21%3A%230000827" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/21:#0000827 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.scientific-publications.net/get/1000049/1632910509459282.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.scientific-publications.net/get/1000049/1632910509459282.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The inequality in society and a multipoint extension of nash bargaining problem

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We use the microeconomic model of supply and demand of financial resources and investment opportunities, in which each contract can be interpreted as a specific Nash bargaining problem, where payoffs are expressed as income from the use of investment opportunities. We identify and describe the phenomenon of investing in a social position. A player investing in a social position can achieve a payoff distribution that is an alternative to the game associated with solving the Nash bargaining problem. Subsequently, we consider games in which players can react to the choice of alternative, providing as a multipoint extension of the Nash bargaining problem. These reactions lead to numerous non-trivial tasks that we describe and interpret in terms of real problems associated with the distribution of social wealth. We analyze games of positional investments with retaliation, games of positional investment with repetition, and games associated with reforms that allow players to expand the area of potential investment opportunities.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The inequality in society and a multipoint extension of nash bargaining problem

Popis výsledku anglicky

We use the microeconomic model of supply and demand of financial resources and investment opportunities, in which each contract can be interpreted as a specific Nash bargaining problem, where payoffs are expressed as income from the use of investment opportunities. We identify and describe the phenomenon of investing in a social position. A player investing in a social position can achieve a payoff distribution that is an alternative to the game associated with solving the Nash bargaining problem. Subsequently, we consider games in which players can react to the choice of alternative, providing as a multipoint extension of the Nash bargaining problem. These reactions lead to numerous non-trivial tasks that we describe and interpret in terms of real problems associated with the distribution of social wealth. We analyze games of positional investments with retaliation, games of positional investment with repetition, and games associated with reforms that allow players to expand the area of potential investment opportunities.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Economy & Business

ISSN

1314-7242

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

2021

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

15

Stát vydavatele periodika

BG - Bulharská republika

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

221-232

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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