POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F24%3A%230001177" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/24:#0001177 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.scientific-publications.net/en/article/1002751/" target="_blank" >https://www.scientific-publications.net/en/article/1002751/</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.62991/EB1996477241" target="_blank" >10.62991/EB1996477241</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of noncooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.

Název v anglickém jazyce

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of noncooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of International Scientific Publications : Economy & Business

ISSN

1314-7242

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

18

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

BG - Bulharská republika

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

19-31

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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