ANALYSIS TOOLS OF POSITIONAL INVESTMENTS AND THE ULTIMATUM GAME

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F23%3A%230001053" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/23:#0001053 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.scientific-publications.net/get/1000060/1698073662342939.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.scientific-publications.net/get/1000060/1698073662342939.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

ANALYSIS TOOLS OF POSITIONAL INVESTMENTS AND THE ULTIMATUM GAME

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper deals with the analysis of players' decision-making, using tools describing the role of positional investing. It discusses the differences between predicted and empirically observed decision- making in the ultimate game (UG). Empirically observed behavior has its rational basis in evaluating the bargaining position of future conflicts. We extend Nash's bargaining problem with a positional neutrality function. The positional neutrality function identifies an area of possible agreement in which one player's position in future games is not improved at the expense of the other. We used this analytical tool in a pilot UG experiment with 64 participants. We study the player's reactions in the experiment after adding additional information on future investment possibilities. Findings from the seven-rounded UG experiment support the predictive ability of positional neutrality functions. Hence, we assume that the “notion of fairness” can be explained as the “notion of positional neutral pay-off division.”

Název v anglickém jazyce

ANALYSIS TOOLS OF POSITIONAL INVESTMENTS AND THE ULTIMATUM GAME

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper deals with the analysis of players' decision-making, using tools describing the role of positional investing. It discusses the differences between predicted and empirically observed decision- making in the ultimate game (UG). Empirically observed behavior has its rational basis in evaluating the bargaining position of future conflicts. We extend Nash's bargaining problem with a positional neutrality function. The positional neutrality function identifies an area of possible agreement in which one player's position in future games is not improved at the expense of the other. We used this analytical tool in a pilot UG experiment with 64 participants. We study the player's reactions in the experiment after adding additional information on future investment possibilities. Findings from the seven-rounded UG experiment support the predictive ability of positional neutrality functions. Hence, we assume that the “notion of fairness” can be explained as the “notion of positional neutral pay-off division.”

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Economy & Business

ISSN

1314-7242

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

17

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

BG - Bulharská republika

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

166-180

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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