The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators during intergroup conflict

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F25840886%3A_____%2F24%3AN0000006" target="_blank" >RIV/25840886:_____/24:N0000006 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513824000035" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513824000035</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2024.01.003" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2024.01.003</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators during intergroup conflict

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A reliable assortment of committed individuals is crucial for success in intergroup conflict due to the danger of shirking. Theory predicts that reliable communication of commitment is afforded by costly signals that track cooperative intent. Across four pre-registered studies (total N = 1440, general US population), we used the public goods game where groups competed for resources to investigate whether and how costly signals function to assort cooperators. We found that costly signals assorted more cooperative participants, creating groups that would win most of the between-group clashes. The same effects were not observed when participants were assigned to signal, implying that signaling tracks but does not create cooperative intent. However, contrary to costly signaling theory, we found that low cost signals were more effective in cooperator assortment compared to high cost signals and suggest that future studies need to focus on signaler perception of cost/benefit trade-off of signaling.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators during intergroup conflict

Popis výsledku anglicky

A reliable assortment of committed individuals is crucial for success in intergroup conflict due to the danger of shirking. Theory predicts that reliable communication of commitment is afforded by costly signals that track cooperative intent. Across four pre-registered studies (total N = 1440, general US population), we used the public goods game where groups competed for resources to investigate whether and how costly signals function to assort cooperators. We found that costly signals assorted more cooperative participants, creating groups that would win most of the between-group clashes. The same effects were not observed when participants were assigned to signal, implying that signaling tracks but does not create cooperative intent. However, contrary to costly signaling theory, we found that low cost signals were more effective in cooperator assortment compared to high cost signals and suggest that future studies need to focus on signaler perception of cost/benefit trade-off of signaling.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50902 - Social sciences, interdisciplinary

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF19_074%2F0012727" target="_blank" >EF19_074/0012727: MSCAfellow3@MUNI</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Evolution and Human Behavior

ISSN

1090-5138

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

45

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

131-143

Kód UT WoS článku

999

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85184241269