Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F46747885%3A24510%2F22%3A00010795" target="_blank" >RIV/46747885:24510/22:00010795 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216224:14210/22:00125962 RIV/25840886:_____/22:N0000004

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.202202" target="_blank" >https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.202202</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.202202" target="_blank" >10.1098/rsos.202202</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Around the world, people engage in practices that involve self-inflicted pain and apparently wasted resources. Researchers theorized that these practices help stabilize within-group cooperation by assorting individuals committed to collective action. While this proposition was previously studied using existing religious practices, we provide a controlled framework for an experimental investigation of various predictions derived from this theory. We recruited 372 university students in the Czech Republic who were randomly assigned into either a high-cost or low-cost condition and then chose to play a public goods game (PGG) either in a group that wastes money to signal commitment to high contributions in the game or to play in the group without such signals. We predicted that cooperators would assort in the high-cost revealed group and that, despite these costs, they would contribute more to the common pool and earn larger individual rewards over five iterations of PGG compared with the concealed group and participants in the low-cost condition. The results showed that the assortment of cooperators was more effective in the high-cost condition and translated into larger contributions of the remaining endowment to the common pool, but participants in the low-cost revealed group earned the most. We conclude that costly signals can serve as an imperfect assorting mechanism, but the size of the costs needs to be carefully balanced with potential benefits to be profitable.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action

Popis výsledku anglicky

Around the world, people engage in practices that involve self-inflicted pain and apparently wasted resources. Researchers theorized that these practices help stabilize within-group cooperation by assorting individuals committed to collective action. While this proposition was previously studied using existing religious practices, we provide a controlled framework for an experimental investigation of various predictions derived from this theory. We recruited 372 university students in the Czech Republic who were randomly assigned into either a high-cost or low-cost condition and then chose to play a public goods game (PGG) either in a group that wastes money to signal commitment to high contributions in the game or to play in the group without such signals. We predicted that cooperators would assort in the high-cost revealed group and that, despite these costs, they would contribute more to the common pool and earn larger individual rewards over five iterations of PGG compared with the concealed group and participants in the low-cost condition. The results showed that the assortment of cooperators was more effective in the high-cost condition and translated into larger contributions of the remaining endowment to the common pool, but participants in the low-cost revealed group earned the most. We conclude that costly signals can serve as an imperfect assorting mechanism, but the size of the costs needs to be carefully balanced with potential benefits to be profitable.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10700 - Other natural sciences

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Royal Society Open Science

ISSN

2054-5703

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

9

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

000800401100004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85130951361