D21 Method: A Path Toward Balanced Elections?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13510%2F25%3A43898772" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13510/25:43898772 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2024.0009" target="_blank" >https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2024.0009</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/elj.2024.0009" target="_blank" >10.1089/elj.2024.0009</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

D21 Method: A Path Toward Balanced Elections?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Some previous attempts to foster societal reconciliation through electoral reform have failed to deliver expected outcomes or introduced unforeseen challenges. In this article, we analyze the D21 electoral system, which belongs to the family of electoral systems intended to moderate election campaigns and reduce societal polarization by allowing for the use of multiple votes. Recognizing the fundamental premise that no electoral system is flawless and can excel in all possible performance criteria, we argue that D21, as a specific representative of vote-for-k methods, offers a balanced set of expectations. We support this claim through comparisons with other voting methods based on criteria related to social utility, strategic behavior, and expected administrative costs and complexity. In the case of social utility and strategic behavior, we conduct comparisons based on well-established criteria. As for administrative costs and complexity, given its unique nature, we rely on the only available concept that we have adapted for the purpose of comparing majoritarian electoral systems. D21, when employing only plus votes, performs reasonably well in all three areas with no significant expected deviations compared to other voting systems. Conversely, the optional minus vote in the D21 method makes strategic behavior easier and causes some administrative challenges.

Název v anglickém jazyce

D21 Method: A Path Toward Balanced Elections?

Popis výsledku anglicky

Some previous attempts to foster societal reconciliation through electoral reform have failed to deliver expected outcomes or introduced unforeseen challenges. In this article, we analyze the D21 electoral system, which belongs to the family of electoral systems intended to moderate election campaigns and reduce societal polarization by allowing for the use of multiple votes. Recognizing the fundamental premise that no electoral system is flawless and can excel in all possible performance criteria, we argue that D21, as a specific representative of vote-for-k methods, offers a balanced set of expectations. We support this claim through comparisons with other voting methods based on criteria related to social utility, strategic behavior, and expected administrative costs and complexity. In the case of social utility and strategic behavior, we conduct comparisons based on well-established criteria. As for administrative costs and complexity, given its unique nature, we rely on the only available concept that we have adapted for the purpose of comparing majoritarian electoral systems. D21, when employing only plus votes, performs reasonably well in all three areas with no significant expected deviations compared to other voting systems. Conversely, the optional minus vote in the D21 method makes strategic behavior easier and causes some administrative challenges.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Election Law Journal

ISSN

1533-1296

e-ISSN

1557-8062

Svazek periodika

24

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

322-341

Kód UT WoS článku

001391535500001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85215689950