Transparency of Lobbying: a Theoretical Approach

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F46747885%3A24310%2F16%3A00000882" target="_blank" >RIV/46747885:24310/16:00000882 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Transparency of Lobbying: a Theoretical Approach

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The aim of this article is to study the links among government, lobbyists, businesses, and citizens in terms of information flows and to design a preliminary model of such links and identify possible consequences. The basic tradable good on political markets is information. Here information acts as goods which serve entities to promote their own interests. The promotion of interests and the information market are therefore the basic factors which are to be the subject of study and discussion in the following considerations. The state is a bureaucratic institution, determines the rules of the game and in non-market decision making obtains information, partially from its own sources and partially from other stakeholders. The opportunity thereby presents itself for stakeholders to influence the government's decision making and bureaucratic apparatus. The entire process can be carried out without transparency and without rules, where companies use lobbying to seek rent from the state as a consequence of high information asymmetry. This situation also brings a high level of uncertainty to all stakeholders, as insiders can become outsiders at virtually any time. If decision-makers wished to behave responsibly in this situation, they would have to trace the necessary information themselves – an attempt at perfect awareness. Although this could increase the quality of a decision, such a decision would likely be accompanied by high additional costs and time demands for obtaining such information and the risk of an adverse selection can certainly not be ruled out. In the transparent environment in which effective rules are established, the risk of information asymmetry (as well as the costs associated with additional rent) and uncertainty are reduced.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Transparency of Lobbying: a Theoretical Approach

Popis výsledku anglicky

The aim of this article is to study the links among government, lobbyists, businesses, and citizens in terms of information flows and to design a preliminary model of such links and identify possible consequences. The basic tradable good on political markets is information. Here information acts as goods which serve entities to promote their own interests. The promotion of interests and the information market are therefore the basic factors which are to be the subject of study and discussion in the following considerations. The state is a bureaucratic institution, determines the rules of the game and in non-market decision making obtains information, partially from its own sources and partially from other stakeholders. The opportunity thereby presents itself for stakeholders to influence the government's decision making and bureaucratic apparatus. The entire process can be carried out without transparency and without rules, where companies use lobbying to seek rent from the state as a consequence of high information asymmetry. This situation also brings a high level of uncertainty to all stakeholders, as insiders can become outsiders at virtually any time. If decision-makers wished to behave responsibly in this situation, they would have to trace the necessary information themselves – an attempt at perfect awareness. Although this could increase the quality of a decision, such a decision would likely be accompanied by high additional costs and time demands for obtaining such information and the risk of an adverse selection can certainly not be ruled out. In the transparent environment in which effective rules are established, the risk of information asymmetry (as well as the costs associated with additional rent) and uncertainty are reduced.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA16-08786S" target="_blank" >GA16-08786S: Dopad transparentnosti lobbingu na demokratizaci a její důsledky</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of 14th International Conference Economic Policy in the European Union Member Countries

ISBN

978-80-7510-210-2

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

368-377

Název nakladatele

Silesian Univerzity

Místo vydání

Karviná

Místo konání akce

Petrovice u Karviné

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2016

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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