How Expensive Transparent Lobbying Is?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F46747885%3A24310%2F18%3A00005589" target="_blank" >RIV/46747885:24310/18:00005589 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.15240/tul/004/2018-2-001" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.15240/tul/004/2018-2-001</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.15240/tul/004/2018-2-001" target="_blank" >10.15240/tul/004/2018-2-001</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

How Expensive Transparent Lobbying Is?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Strengthening the transparency of the legislation and decision making process should contribute to the reduction of negative impacts often connected with lobbying. The aim of the article was to determine options for lobbying transparency increase and their evaluation from the viewpoint of regulatory costs. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) which is the core method of Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), is used. The basic options were determined. Zero option was defined as the preservation of the current legislation and non-transparent lobbying. Option I is the possibility of increasing the transparency of lobbying by measures introduced on lobbyists. Option II represents an increase of transparency in terms of lobbying targets. Option III is defined as increase in lobbying transparency by means of sunshine principles and the increase of lobbying transparency by monitoring and sanctions includes Option IV. Regulatory costs, specifically the compliance costs and other regulatory costs have been defined for all five options.

Název v anglickém jazyce

How Expensive Transparent Lobbying Is?

Popis výsledku anglicky

Strengthening the transparency of the legislation and decision making process should contribute to the reduction of negative impacts often connected with lobbying. The aim of the article was to determine options for lobbying transparency increase and their evaluation from the viewpoint of regulatory costs. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) which is the core method of Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), is used. The basic options were determined. Zero option was defined as the preservation of the current legislation and non-transparent lobbying. Option I is the possibility of increasing the transparency of lobbying by measures introduced on lobbyists. Option II represents an increase of transparency in terms of lobbying targets. Option III is defined as increase in lobbying transparency by means of sunshine principles and the increase of lobbying transparency by monitoring and sanctions includes Option IV. Regulatory costs, specifically the compliance costs and other regulatory costs have been defined for all five options.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA16-08786S" target="_blank" >GA16-08786S: Dopad transparentnosti lobbingu na demokratizaci a její důsledky</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

ACC Journal

ISSN

1803-9782

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

24

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

7-19

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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