Sellars, we-intentions and ought-statements

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F49777513%3A23330%2F21%3A43955577" target="_blank" >RIV/49777513:23330/21:43955577 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://rdcu.be/bMTh8" target="_blank" >https://rdcu.be/bMTh8</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02349-9" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11229-019-02349-9</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Sellars, we-intentions and ought-statements

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

My paper is concerned with the relation between ought-statements and intentions in Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy. According to an entrenched view in Sellars scholarship, Sellars considers ought-statements as expressions of we-intentions. The aim of my paper is to question this reading and to propose an alternative. According to this alternative reading of Sellars, ought-statements are metalinguistic statements about the implication relations between intentions. I show that the entrenched understanding faces many unacknowledged problems and generates incompatibilities with Sellars’s commitments about intentions. I argue that the alternative account can help to resolve these problems. A second reason in support of the alternative understanding of Sellars is provided by historical considerations. I argue that my alternative account can be discerned in Sellars’s most developed views about intentions and ought-statements. I also discuss problems and questions which the alternative reading itself faces.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Sellars, we-intentions and ought-statements

Popis výsledku anglicky

My paper is concerned with the relation between ought-statements and intentions in Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy. According to an entrenched view in Sellars scholarship, Sellars considers ought-statements as expressions of we-intentions. The aim of my paper is to question this reading and to propose an alternative. According to this alternative reading of Sellars, ought-statements are metalinguistic statements about the implication relations between intentions. I show that the entrenched understanding faces many unacknowledged problems and generates incompatibilities with Sellars’s commitments about intentions. I argue that the alternative account can help to resolve these problems. A second reason in support of the alternative understanding of Sellars is provided by historical considerations. I argue that my alternative account can be discerned in Sellars’s most developed views about intentions and ought-statements. I also discuss problems and questions which the alternative reading itself faces.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

SYNTHESE

ISSN

0039-7857

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

198

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

25

Strana od-do

4415-4439

Kód UT WoS článku

000652470300022

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85106755499