Sellars on the Intersubjectivity of “We-Intentions”
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F49777513%3A23330%2F23%3A43966688" target="_blank" >RIV/49777513:23330/23:43966688 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003303619-3/sellars-intersubjectivity-intentions-stefanie-dach?context=ubx&refId=474623f1-844f-4310-9efa-7e5f0708be89" target="_blank" >https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003303619-3/sellars-intersubjectivity-intentions-stefanie-dach?context=ubx&refId=474623f1-844f-4310-9efa-7e5f0708be89</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003303619-3" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003303619-3</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Sellars on the Intersubjectivity of “We-Intentions”
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The notion of intersubjective “we-intentions” is central to Sellars's philosophical system, especially to his account of morality. However, what precisely makes these intentions intersubjective and why we need them often remains unclear in Sellars's texts. This chapter attempts to bring more clarity to these issues. I argue that we can characterize the moral domain from a Sellarsian perspective as a domain of consonant practical reasoning with intentions. I show that “I-intentions” cannot serve in such consonant practical reasoning because of two constraining features: their indexicality and their merely relative reasonableness. I then reconstruct how Sellars can address these two problems. I also suggest that there is a change in Sellars's ideas about the intersubjective aspects of we-intentions at the end of his career, where he seems to abandon his former “mode account.” Based on this reconstruction of Sellars's motivations for introducing intersubjective intentions, I argue that this change is a sensible one.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Sellars on the Intersubjectivity of “We-Intentions”
Popis výsledku anglicky
The notion of intersubjective “we-intentions” is central to Sellars's philosophical system, especially to his account of morality. However, what precisely makes these intentions intersubjective and why we need them often remains unclear in Sellars's texts. This chapter attempts to bring more clarity to these issues. I argue that we can characterize the moral domain from a Sellarsian perspective as a domain of consonant practical reasoning with intentions. I show that “I-intentions” cannot serve in such consonant practical reasoning because of two constraining features: their indexicality and their merely relative reasonableness. I then reconstruct how Sellars can address these two problems. I also suggest that there is a change in Sellars's ideas about the intersubjective aspects of we-intentions at the end of his career, where he seems to abandon his former “mode account.” Based on this reconstruction of Sellars's motivations for introducing intersubjective intentions, I argue that this change is a sensible one.
Klasifikace
Druh
C - Kapitola v odborné knize
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA20-04496S" target="_blank" >GA20-04496S: Jak zkonstruovat pragmatismus - Wilfrid Sellars a pragmatistická tradice</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2023
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název knihy nebo sborníku
Ethics, Practical Reasoning, Agency: Wilfrid Sellars’s Practical Philosophy
ISBN
978-1-03-230143-3
Počet stran výsledku
21
Strana od-do
15-35
Počet stran knihy
262
Název nakladatele
Routledge
Místo vydání
New York
Kód UT WoS kapitoly
—